
















The abstraction of the ‘real’ by way of the genres of fictional and scientific discourse, and its 
return in the contested, perturbative interval affected between them – one which, at the same 
time, threatens to envelope and subsume them both – acquires a particular historical focus at 
that moment when History itself is declared to be at an end. The liminal arrangement of these 
terms has, from its beginning, been orientated in the anticipation, projection and transcendence 
of precisely such ends. Radically anachronistic, recursive and polysemic, ‘science fiction’ in its 
broadest ramification inaugurates – despite (or indeed, because of) its culturally diminished 
stature – a deconstruction of teleology, of instrumentalist reason, of techno-mysticism, of the 
ideology of mimēsis and of the metaphysics of presence. In its most incisive forms, it demands a 
thorough critique of those philosophies of the ‘virtual’ which had flourished at the close of the 
twentieth century, and of the ‘return of the real’ in those discourses of the Anthropocene that 
have dominated the twenty-first. 
 
 
No one has ever lived in the past… and no one will live in the 
future…  
Jean-Luc Godard, Alphaville 
 
On 20 July 1969, when Apollo 11 commander Neil Armstrong stepped off the 
Lunar Module’s ladder and onto the surface of the Moon, 53 million people 
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worldwide watched the event transmitted in hazy black-and-white, live on TV. 
Allowing, that is, for a 1.3 second delay between the moon and the Parkes radio 
telescope in Australia that received the original signal, and an additional 0.3 
second delay between Sydney and Houston: comparable to a long-distance 
telephone call at that time, negligible in fact, almost like being there. Armstrong 
described it as a performance “in front of the largest audience in history.” It was 
an event that promised to transform what it meant to be human, while bringing 
for the very first time other worlds within ‘our’ grasp: a triumph of ingenuity 
and determination, of scientific rationalism, of the sentimental delusion of a 
global ‘social media’ avant la lettre. A bogus solidarity, in other words, of the 
industrially privileged, as belied in Gil Scott Heron’s “Whitey On The Moon”: 
 
You know, the man just upped my rent last night 
Cause whitey’s on the moon 
No hot water, no toilets, no light 
But whitey’s on the moon…2 
 
Mankind’s giant leap towards this final frontier was never less ideological than it 
was technical. And while the collective romanticism of exploration and 
discovery – of landing a “man on the moon” – paled against the massive 
political, engineering, economic and evolutionary effort to put “him” there (with 
400,000 mostly faceless workers keeping the whole project functional), the fact 
remains that in accomplishing itself the proclaimed ambition of speaking in the 
first person plural of all humanity, of “the world,” has perhaps become more 
virtual than ever. This was only to be expected, considering the equally vast 
ideological logistics of this most accomplished of simulacra.  
The largest single logistical undertaking since the D-Day landings – 
culminating in a total of just two-and-a-half hours of footprints-and-flag activity 
on the lunar surface – was watched on TV by an unprecedented number of 
viewers, yet in a profound sense was witnessed by no-one.3 With the return to 
Earth of Apollo 17 and the cancellation of the lunar programme in December 
1972, the “great leap for mankind” beyond low Earth orbit – so far unrepeated 
 
2  Gil Scott Heron, A New Black Poet – Small Talk at 125th and Lenox (New York: Flying 
Dutchman Records, 1970). 
3  Other than Armstrong, Aldrin and Collins themselves – and even then, the question is 
moot – though now we have Damien Chazelle’s Armstrong biopic, First Man (2018), as 






since – emphatically did not pave the way for a mass excursion to follow in those 
pioneering footsteps, like homesteaders to a new western frontier: at least not 
within the generational timeframe by which modernity has become accustomed 
to gauging such recent historical movements. As Baudrillard might easily have 
said, the Apollo moon-landing ostensibly did not take place.4 It represents, in its 
recoil to a ubiquitous present tense, the simulacrum of a “new frontier” existing 
ostensibly as remote televised images and audio transmissions – what 
commentators on Earth have long referred to in the singular as a media event: an 
ideological ripple in the fabric of Realpolitik (whose orphaned logos has already 
crossed interstellar space, more alien than ever).  
Tom Wolfe, writing on the 40th anniversary of mankind’s “giant leap,” could 
declare: “the American space programme, the grandest, most Promethean […] 
quest in the history of the world, died in infancy at 10:56 p.m. New York time on 
July 20, 1969, the moment the foot of Apollo 11’s Commander Armstrong touched 
the surface of the Moon.”5 The mystifications of this new Prometheus were never 
likely to survive the first moments of this ideal consummation: in an instant, the 
entire course of Western culture was undone. It was not, as the chauvinists said, 
that the great goddess was reduced to a whore, or merely a lump of rock no 
more magical than any other – like Roquentin’s pebble on the beach – but that 
the myth of culture itself, the very possibility of the dream, had been turned to 
travesty. The moon had become just another repository for ideological trash: an 




As quickly as it had emerged from it, the future of manned space exploration 
receded into the ‘dream factory’ of a kind of cinema. As a residue of TV images 
and moon-rock paraphernalia, Apollo presented – in front of the entire world – 
a dissolution of the real into science fiction, and thus the dissolution of History into 
genre. In doing so, Apollo readmitted the phantasmatic into the realm of 
scientific rationalism: the phantasm of disillusionment. It effected a suspension of 
disbelief in what, until then, had represented itself as a purely instrumental 
domain of veracity and verification. It inscribed ‘humanity’ within a new 
technological metaphysic: one which, by foreclosing upon an idea of futurity, 
evoked a futurism capable of incorporating (like the neoliberal, post-Fordist 
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economics it coincided with) the most fantastically ‘excluded’ elements of the 
industrial imaginary, from Ballardianism to Afrofuturism, in place of the real.  
The apparition of this paradox was not only a consequence of, but was in a 
sense necessitated by, the act of setting foot on the moon – like some spectre of a 
future doomed to repeat itself in the register of a science-fiction that itself has 
already ceased to exist as fiction: not by virtue of its historical ‘realisation,’ but 
because the major determination of that ‘real’ which will have taken its place is 
revealed as nothing more than a repetition automation. (This ‘real’ as that which 
recurs in the place we expect to find it: no thing, but the pure technicity of 
recurrence itself.) Which in turn marks the limit and horizon of those 
conceptions of a future bounded by cybernetic interfaces (data prostheses) – 
analogues of a symbolic order that, in becoming purely mimetic, is ‘restored’ to 
a metaphysical array. For example, this rhapsodic episode from Virilio: 
 
We might even imagine that one day, having donned a suit of interactive 
data – the DATA SUIT – our internaut will launch himself into a new 
kind of adventure tourism, discovering the ancient world with the 
assistance of positioning and surveillance satellites overflying him 
without letup. 
 As though playing a pinball machine, our explorer could then touch 
the summit of Everest or the slopes of Kilimanjaro with one single 
gesture… Sweep his hand over the shores of the Pacific, caress the 
wetness of the seas that lurk there… And who knows? Maybe some day 
in the near future or soon after, he will TOUCH THE MOON, feel the 
aridity of the Sea of Tranquillity, searching somewhat gropingly for the 
tools dumped up there, in 1969, by the men of the Apollo 11 mission.6 
 
Baudrillard will have insisted that “There is no real and no imaginary except at 
a certain distance,”7 yet this (prosthetic) distance is nothing if not the very 
measure of a temporal precession in which ‘the future’ isn’t a reflection-effect but 
the possibility of a reflection itself occurring at the limits of foreclosure. In other 
words, of différance. 
In the larger scheme of things, there is no other condition than this. And it is 
precisely at its most simulacral of moments, in its progress towards self-
 
6  Paul Virilio, City of Panic, trans. Julie Rose (Oxford: Berg, 2007) 141-42. 
7  Jean Baudrillard, “Two Essays,” trans. Arthur B. Evans, Science Fiction Studies, 18.55 
(November 1991), www.depauw.edu/sfs/backissues/55/baudrillard55art.htm, accessed 





supersession, that humanity is given to perceive its future – or ‘no future’ – in 
the most tentative and fraught of narcissistic fantasies: six million years of 
evolution condensed into the image of a man in a spacesuit with a life-support 
system strapped to his back, on a piece of rock half-a-million kilometres from the 
only known breathable atmosphere, drifting at the edge of a cinematic vastness 
in which the probability of survival is statistically zero. By a singular act of 
‘transcendence,’ the contingency of human existence upon technology – or rather the 
technological condition of humanity itself – is brought clearly into view, such that 
the future perpetuation of the species is now seen (without the slightest trace of 
paradox) as belonging to the realm of the science fictional. And if cinema represents 
‘our’ collective dream, then this future of humanity – divorced from any other 
possible ‘realism’ – would be experienced, if nothing else, as a dream of cinema. 
 
Simulacra and Science Fiction 
 
In a short text published in 1991 under the sway of Philip K. Dick’s 1964 novel,8 
The Simulacra, there is a reformulation by Baudrillard of a schema developed 
over the prior two decades, in which a residual idea of truth features as the 
pretext of a general simulationism. Here, the corresponding “orders” of the real 
and the fictional (“there is no more fiction”) collapse into a universal field of 
simulacra:  
 
There are three orders of simulacra: 
 
(1) natural, naturalistic simulacra: based on image, imitation, and 
counterfeiting. They are harmonious, optimistic, and aim at the 
reconstitution, or the ideal institution, of a nature in God’s image. 
 
(2) productive, productionist simulacra: based on energy and force, 
materialized by the machine and the entire system of production. Their 
aim is Promethean: world-wide application, continuous expansion, 
liberation of indeterminate energy (desire is part of the utopias belonging 
to this order of simulacra). 
 
(3) simulation simulacra: based on information, the model, cybernetic 
play. Their aim is maximum operationality, hyperreality, total control. 
 
 





To the first order corresponds the imaginary of the utopia. To the second, 
SF [science fiction] in the strict sense. To the third... is there yet an 
imaginary domain which corresponds to this order?9  
 
If the Fukuyamaesque domain of the End of History and the birth of the 
“virtual” that Baudrillard traces in its emergence out of the 
neoliberal/postmodernist nexus corresponds today with what is called the 
Anthropocene, it does so only insofar as this ‘epoch’ announces not the 
transcendence of primitivist, industrialist or cybernetic posthumanism, but rather 
the ‘truth’ of a return of Humanism in its most apocalyptic formulation. Such an 
apocalypticism would in no way break with the “classical (and even cybernetic) 
viewpoint” in which, Baudrillard reminds us, “technology is an extension of the 
body” as “the evolved capacity of a human organism which allows it both to 
rival Nature and to triumphantly remould it in its own image.”10 In other words, 
the apocalyptic view of the Anthropocene remains one of pure instrumentality, 
whether as a discourse of mitigation or of transcendence, repair or redundancy, 
sustainability or exit. Nothing will have escaped recuperation to the human idea, 
even its own supersession. Here the dialectical character of Baudrillard’s schema 
comes into view as the real teleology of the simulacral as such (from the world in 
“God’s image” to the image as god) – a movement uncannily retraced in the 
more recent (de)anthropic turn of François Laruelle’s “general science fiction.”  
“Science fiction,” Laruelle argues, “is a minor genre of literature entrusted to 
an arbitrary imaginary […] but it is possible to refound it […] as a non-
philosophical genre, on strictly generic bases, ones that are consolidated by 
another use of the quantic, as model rather than as furnishing of the Universe.”11 
This re-founding of science fiction, as a strategic re-founding of philosophy, 
assumes the form of an inverted Platonism, and like Baudrillard’s schema adopts 
a predictably tripartite form: 
 
1) “the introduction of contemporary science in the form of the quantic as 
model into the heart [of science fiction]”; 
 
2) “its object or outcome is the destiny of humanity in transit between the 
Earth, the World, and the Universe”; 
 
9  Baudrillard n.p. 
10  Baudrillard n.p. 






3) “the ‘World’ as Bad-world or history is only an unplanned and unfortunate 
halting point on this voyage which leads it to the Just-world.”12 
 
In this, too, we are challenged with the need to de-schematize the concept of 
“simulacrum” as that of an anthropo-teleology which would recuperate science 
fiction’s “cognitive estrangement”13 for a genre of dialectical reason (even one 
posed in the guise of non-philosophy). It is necessary, nonetheless, to identify the 
seemingly counter-intuitive forms in which this logic reconstitutes itself, whether 
under the constellation of a metaphysics or of a technologism.  
Between Baudrillard and Laruelle, the precession of simulacra and the 
ascent/descent of the anthropic14 describes the topology of a certain “truth” that 
doubles the movement of Reason itself. Conceived by Lacan as the inscription of 
the analytic scene par excellence, this movement narrates itself as the very object it 
seeks to discover. Just as “the unconscious is structured like a language,”15 Lacan 
is able to propose that “truth declares itself in the structure of fiction.”16 If science 
(as “quantic model”) binds truth within a system of prediction or predication (in 
which, for Lacan, its signifier always reaches its destination), this is only to the 
extent that the system of science itself stands in place of truth. This identification of 
the one with the other nevertheless turns upon an irreducible “cognitive 
estrangement,” since – in and of “itself” – truth can never be subsumed into a 
mere coincidence with any scientific system or systematicity in general.  
The art of revelation (of truth) that here supposedly belong to science 
remains indelibly that of a fiction, of the possibility of fiction, which would 
include the fictionality of representation as such. For it is at precisely this point of 
revelation (the consciousness of simulacra; the subsumption into utopia) that a 
“quantic” truth elides with mimēsis. It is a measure of even the most ‘materialist’ 
 
12  Terrence Blake, “Laruelle and Radical Science Fiction” (October 2019), https:// 
www.researchgate.net/publication/336304335_LARUELLE_AND_RADICAL_SCIENC
E_FICTION, accessed 19 December 2019. 
13  Darko Suvin sought to define science fiction as a “literary genre whose necessary and 
sufficient conditions are the presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, 
and whose main formal device is an imaginative framework alternative to the author's 
empirical environment.” See The Encyclopaedia of Science Fiction (“Darko Suvin”), 
http://www.sf-encyclopedia.com/entry/suvin_darko, accessed 19 December 2019. 
14  Blake n.p.: “One could summarise Laruelle’s complete formula for science fiction: hard 
science, space opera, human destiny from dystopia to utopia.” 
15  Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the 
Freudian Unconscious,” Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006) 671ff. 





(of such discussions remains bound to what amounts to a teleological/ 
instrumentalist conception of both temporality and technology, by way of an 
equally teleological/instrumentalist conception of knowledge and information. It 
would be easy to cite further examples, more or less at random, to demonstrate 
this point, but one more should be sufficient. Thus: 
 
Science fiction works to extrapolate elements of the present, push actually 
existing conditions all the way to the most extreme consequences. That is 
to say, science fiction is not about the actual future, rather it’s about 
futurity, if I can use that as an abstract noun… Science fiction grasps and 
brings to visibility what the philosopher Gilles Deleuze calls the virtual, 
or what Karl Marx sometimes called tendential processes. Tendential 
things or tendencies are not things that have to happen but there’s a 
movement towards their happening. Science fiction picks at certain 
implicit trends that are embedded in our actual social technological 
situation. These are elements of a futurity which exist in the present, they 
aren’t really present because they’re not really happening but they 
represent a kind of futurity, whether or not they actually turn out to 
happen in the future.17 
 
Tendential processes, like algorithmic processes, are entroped: they are turned 
towards the production of ‘possible’ futures. Which is to say, they represent 
means of production of possibility as such: one via the amplification of 
emergence, the other through foreclosure. The zone in which these 
complementary functions appear to intersect is, however, not a representation in 
prototype, nor a predictive model, but a simulacrum of instrumental reason 
itself, as the spectral hauntology of that which is always yet-to-come. 
 
Future (as) Cinema  
 
Even if its ‘image’ is literally that of a kind of cinematograph, a certain technical 
evolution – from Méliès’ Le Voyage dans la lune (1902) to Kubrick’s 2001: A Space 
Odyssey (1968) and beyond – has predisposed the discourse of instrumental 
reason to a dominant mode of realism – even of the fantastic, of the impossible. Its 
aesthetic logic – on the pretence of being internally verifiable – has tended, since 
 
17  Steven Shaviro, No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism (London: Continuum, 
2015) https://manifold.umn.edu/read/no-speed-limit/section/1b09b41b-002e-4b2d-ade0-





its inception, towards the foregone conclusion, the self-fulfilling-prophesy, the 
fait accompli. This teleological faculty is deeply rooted in the structure of the 
image itself, in its reflection effect, and in that projective Reason whose temporal 
difference nevertheless appears to resolve the very paradox of manifold Time 
itself, by inscribing cinema as history (as Godard has said) within a future that is 
already the truth of cinema. No longer would it be to necessarily speak of the 
future as a dream of the unpresentable – of the fantasy of the real or of an 
immanence beyond presentiment – but as the necessity and impossibility of 
representation as such.  
Here stands the crux of the dispute between science and fiction. Before the 
question of verity is even able to pose itself, it must contemplate this vista and 
will ultimately stake everything upon it. For, like fiction, it belongs to a radically 
determinate universe, in which it is nevertheless unable to envisage its own end. 
Confronted with a proliferation of singularities, it evokes a crisis of universal 
laws: physics itself breaks down. And like institutionalised psychoses, these 
singularities have nowhere to go unless it is to reconstitute the universal elsewhere, 
under other regimes (of the law) (of Reason) – in some parallel dimension, perhaps. 
But are we not forever in some parallel dimension? The dimension of signifiance? 
The “End of History” did not require the Apollo moon-landing to bring it into 
view – other than in the realm of a certain political conspiranoia – just as it did 
not require Auschwitz or Darwinian evolution. Wherever the insurmountable 
has been evoked, depicted, or instrumentalised, it has only ever served to 
instigate a countermovement, tending quasi-dialectically to the production of 
historical prostheses: a technology of indefinite extension, renewal, reproduction.  
Even if the very premise of such a thing as evolution demands a corresponding 
thought of the finitude of ‘man,’ of an idea of humanity bound to supersession, it 
also advances a mechanism for the transcendence, not only the contingencies of 
worldly existence, but of evolution itself. And here lies the seeming paradox of the 
so-called ‘present condition’: humanity – that collective phantasm – has either to 
exist in the real futures of its technological dreaming, or cease to be. Which is to 
say, it must confront that fact of its having already ceased to be. To rephrase 
Marx, a spectre is haunting Reason; the spectre of humanity. And if Landian 
hyperstitionality can be understood in Mark Fisher’s terms as the dialectical 
counterpart of a hauntology of lost futures18 – being the driving impetus of every 
posthumanism – this too demands an understanding of what amounts to a 
ressentiment in the instrumentalised fiction of the End-of-History. To evolve 
 
18  Mark Fisher, Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures 





beyond its Earthly condition, like the “talents” (mutants) of Dick’s novels, or 
seek to conserve itself in a metaphorical iron lung, cryogenically immersed for 
untold millennia in a ‘virtual reality’ from which there can, in fact, be no exit (no 
other reality), the idea of humanity becomes the adversary of the world. 
It’s as if, overwhelmed by the creeping pessimism of a revealed certainty, an 
untold resourcefulness contained in the words ‘science fiction’ finally becomes 
apparent, not as a smoke-and-mirrors distraction from the so-called real world, 
but as the ‘real world.’ Quotidian experience has become saturated with the 
technological legacies of Apollo: the pervasively simulacral access to experience 
defined by the World Wide Web, cloud computing, algorithmic social media, 
dronology and the proliferation of data-harvesting. Humanity has indeed 
already become a hostile figment of its global self, a malevolent spectral presence 
in the expanded field of a spectacularised present that no longer acts as if to 
mask the provisional fictionality of any given future (those former ‘manifest 
destinies’) but to mask the fact of humanity’s ‘real absence’ from a future that 
can only exist on those terms. (Such has been theorised at length by Guy Debord 
in The Society of the Spectacle [1967] and explored cinematically in such films as 
Chris Markers La Jetée [1962] and Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s 1973 telemovie 
Welt am Draht.)  
Having apparently become the god-like agents of technological evolution in 
the Anthropocene, humanity is confronted with an unbearable scenario – in 
which the world-to-come is no longer provisional upon human agency, but the 
contrary, as what Artaud called a subjectile, produced by space-time algorithms 
of stochastic feedback. And this in turn requires a particular sanguine view of 
things, if what passes for a critical and cultural consciousness is not to regress 
into a neo-Humanistic sentimentality – which may be said, in light of the 
cybernetic revolution that followed from it, to account for a certain existential 
turn in post-Apollo science-fictional real-ism. Yet this would not be the same 
thing as Baudrillard’s insistence that  
 
the SF of this era of cybernetics and hyperreality will only be able to 
attempt to ‘artificially’ resurrect the ‘historical’ worlds of the past, trying 
to reconstruct in vitro and down to its tiniest details the various episodes 
of bygone days: events, persons, defunct ideologies – all now empty of 
meaning and of their original essence, but hypnotic with retrospective 
truth. […] like a gigantic hologram in three dimensions, where fiction will 
never again be a mirror held to the future, but rather a desperate 
rehallucinating of the past.19  
 
 





A past which is always already a work, a texture or fabric or web, of 
hallucinations. That is to say, of what Lacan calls “the fundamental fantasy.”20 
 
The Truth in Fiction 
 
“It is truth […]” Lacan notes (in his seminar on Edgar Allan Poe’s “The 
Purloined Letter”), “that makes the very existence of fiction possible.”21 And 
while a certain appeal to common sense might seek to define science as that 
domain of “systematic and formulated knowledge” (OED), and therefore of 
“truth,” from which fiction must necessarily be excluded, such a “common sense” 
is contradicted by an integral relationship between fiction and truth that lies at 
the heart of a body of philosophical thought encompassing the work of Plato 
(dialogues), Descartes (Meditations), Leibniz (the doctrine of infinitesimal 
magnitudes) and Kant (das Ding-an-sich), among others. Terms such as 
‘conjecture,’ ‘hypothesis,’ ‘model,’ ‘theorem,’ ‘experiment’ anchor scientific 
discourse. One speaks of a ‘calculus of probability,’ of an ‘uncertainty principle,’ 
of ‘complexity’ and ‘indeterminacy.’ Yet while such terms remain distinguished 
from speculation of the merely ‘imaginary’ kind, within any scientific 
description we inevitably encounter propositions that are in some regard 
provisional, analogical, or metaphoric – in short, a whole poetics. In so doing, we 
find ourselves in a zone of ambivalence between ‘science,’ as it is commonly 
understood, and rhetoric, philosophy, literature, art, cinematography, etc. 
It has always been a feature of science that its capacity to know is ultimately 
determined by its capacity to formulate representations of the unknown. 
Ordinarily, this takes the form of testable hypotheses. An hypothesis, as Henri 
Poincaré once remarked, is first and foremost a type of generalisation: it provides 
an overall framework upon which to structure a local or worldview. Such 
hypotheses nevertheless also present science with a dilemma, since until they are 
proven they are potentially false – indeed, in this provisional state, they are no 
more than elaborately constructed as ifs. In other words, species of fiction. And 
yet hypothesis is necessary for science to proceed, in anticipation of experimental 
proofs or observable facts.22  
 
20  Jacques Lacan, Le séminaire VIII: Le transfert, 1960-61, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: 
Seuil, 1991) 127. 
21  Lacan, “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” 7. 
22  The question of the epistemological status of fiction has evoked a great deal of debate. 
Strong positions have been taken especially against supposed forms of cultural 
relativism, in which the differences between science and the arts are allowed to become 





During the late eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham formulated a “theory of 
fictions” in which fiction was regarded positively as an unavoidable and indeed 
indispensable product of all discourse – as distinct from Francis Bacon’s view of 
fiction as a superstitious “idol.” Bentham recognised the necessary similarities 
between the conjectural form of scientific method and so-called literary 
language. Developing this line of thought from the late nineteenth century, Hans 
Vaihinger, in his Philosophy of As If: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and 
Religious Fictions of Mankind (published 1911), specified an array of instances in 
which “fictive” thinking – or the “fictive activity of the logical function” – lends 
impetus to such practical and theoretical domains as biology, mathematics, 
physics, philosophy, psychology, and jurisprudence. Although Vaihinger made 
distinctions between different kinds of fiction, all of them were reducible to the 
sequence of thought encapsulated by the “as if.” Additionally, Vaihinger argued 
that science – as a set of experimental epistemologies – is necessarily speculative, 
since it can never really “know” (or directly experience) the underlying reality of 
the world. Rather, it constructs simulations and acts “as if” these correspond to 





The worldview presented by scientific reason is, for Vaihinger, thus constructed 
upon a fictional foundation, albeit a highly coherent and functional one (a system 
of representations that works; an economimesis inherently productive of a critique 
of the spontaneity of socalled unmediated experience, of presentation).23 This 
view reflects the practical reliance of science upon hypothesis, but also a 
dependence upon technically-mediated forms of verification (everything from 
high-speed photography, to x-ray and infrared, to the Large Hadron Collider). 
From the industrial revolution onwards, it has been increasingly the case that 
science is concerned with what, for human observers, remains fundamentally 
 
relativistic standpoint it is argued that the use of fiction and hypothesis obey strict 
rules from the point of view of finality and justification, which forbid us to consider 
fiction and hypothesis as equivalent. We may see, however, that a so-called 
‘equivalence of fictions’ is not the same as recognising an equivalence of discursive 
structures. (To rephrase Wittgenstein, there is no ‘scientific language,’ there is only 
language as such; for a proposition to be possible at all, it must be possible across 
discourse, without exception. It is for precisely this reason that an environment of 
‘alternative facts’ is able to operate at all.)  





unknowable or unpresentable – if by knowable we also mean directly available to 
experience rather than as an artefact of a calculus or system of thought or 
methodology.  
Vaihinger’s theory of fictions likewise attempted to address questions of 
subjectivity and the preponderance of individuals to employ psychological 
fictions to mediate their experience of ‘irrational’ social realities.24 The forms of 
simulacra encountered in paranoia and hysteria, for example, point towards a 
functional equivalence of reality and fiction at certain crucial junctures (for 
example, in the experience of what Philippe Pinel, in his 1802 Traité médico-
philosophique sur l’aliénation mentale ou la manie, termed “mental alienation”): an 
equivalence that comes to haunt not only the methodological dependency of 
scientific positivism upon the “as if,” but also the status of this “as if” as 
foundational for scientific method as such (because foundational for reason). It poses, 
in short, the question of a ‘fictional rationality,’ which has potentially far-reaching 
consequences for the epistemological privileges attendant upon the forms of 
rationality – principle among them being the discourse of realism (which it is, 
incidentally, the ‘task’ of science, as it was once the ‘task’ of philosophy, to 
distinguish from fiction: the valorisation, we might say, of techno-scientific capital). 
Where the philosophy of Vaihinger bears most incisively upon the question 
of “science fiction,” though, is with regards to the domain of the unverifiable. Just 
as a ‘literature of the possible’ must necessarily evoke the limits of the im-
possible, so too the generalised form of hypothesis must also evoke a type of 
irrational counterpart. Vaihinger argued that fiction forms a class of hypothesis not 
subject to ordinary criteria of verification: not merely because such fictions are 
patently false, but because certain hypotheses concern problems for which there are no 
‘rational’ solutions. It’s here that such later developments as set theory, general 
relativity, quantum, chaos, etc. are confirmed in their suspicion of the existence 
of seemingly ‘irrational’ logics that violate, contradict or negate what amount to 
ideological assumptions in the framing of universal laws.  
In an attempt to establish general criteria for scientific discourse, Karl Popper 
famously invoked the term “falsifiability.”25 Any statement that can be 
demonstrated to be true, can be falsified – and it is the possibility for falsification 
that distinguishes science from ‘mere’ fiction, since in the realm of fiction there 
are formal criteria of verifiability. Indeed, fiction – as Vaihinger earlier argued – 
 
24  Ideas which echo those of Charcot, Breuer and Freud concerning hysteria – in which 
psychosomatic illness is recognised as indistinguishable from ‘conventional’ illness. 
25  Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 





represents precisely what is un-verifiable. And since it is not verifiable, neither is 
it falsifiable. This dualistic view, however, exposes itself to a number of 
important ambiguities, and it is from this core of ambiguity that “science fiction” 




When Amazing Stories editor Hugo Gernsback coined the term “scientifiction” (in 
“Baron Münchhausen’s New Scientific Adventures: Thought Transmission on 
Mars,” in the January 1916 issue of Electrical Experimenter)26 – ten years before 
John Logie Baird demonstrated a viable television broadcast system – it 
anticipated an emerging new wave of popular techno-consumerism that would 
reach its height in 1950s America, at precisely the time when former Nazi rocket 
scientist, Wernher von Braun – the man largely responsible for the V2 – was 
teaming up with Walt Disney on the production of a series of TV advertorials 
(based on von Braun’s 1948 “novel” Das Marsprojekt and a series of articles later 
published in Colliers entitled “Man Will Conquer Space Soon”) to promote the 
seemingly fantastic idea of putting a man on the moon.27 By the time von Braun 
was heading NASA’s Marshal Space Flight Center, tasked with developing the 
Saturn V rocket, space travel had moved from the realm of fantasy to that of 
plausible science (or what Gernsback called “science faction”28), and its popular 
 
26  Hugo Gernsback, “Baron Münchhausen’s New Scientific Adventures: Thought 
Transmission on Mars,” Electrical Experimenter, 3.9 (January 1916): 475. 
27  In the twentieth century, with the increased prevalence of new information and 
communication technologies, and of mass mechanised warfare, many writers no longer 
viewed “science fiction” as representing a domain of literary utopianism, but rather a 
state of affairs reflecting a technocratised reality. We might think of George Orwell’s 
1984; Karel Čapek’s R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots); or even Fred M. Wilcox’s 1956 
film Forbidden Planet in which Shakespeare’s Caliban reappears in the form of a robotic 
“id monster” (Reason’s nemesis). During the 1920s and ‘30s, the rise of fascism 
exploited a wide-spread form of technological irrationalism and utopianism, sustained 
by a massive project of pseudo-scientific propaganda. In reaction, during the period 
following WW2 we encounter increasingly radical elements in ‘science fictional’ 
writing – including the work of novelists like Anthony Burgess (A Clockwork Orange) 
and behavioural scientists like José Delgado (Towards a Psychocivilised Society). These 
works respond in conflicting ways to the belief that social ills, including the abuse of 
science represented by the Nazi holocaust, may be remedied by means of new forms of 
ethics, education and social engineering. 
28  Hugo Gernsback, “Science Fiction versus Science Faction,” Wonder Stories Quarterly, 2.1 





depiction in film evolved accordingly: from George Pal’s Destination Moon (1950) 
– which borrowed von Braun’s moonrocket design and incorporated plot 
elements that would uncannily recur in Alfons Cuarón’s Gravity (2013) – to 
Kubrick’s 2001, which famously employed a team of NASA engineers and 
cyberneticists, including Marvin Minsky, as production consultants. 
In the period between the wars, science entered into everyday life in entirely 
unprecedented ways. By the time terms like “science fiction” and “sci-fi” 
appeared in the 1930s and 1940s, the popular awareness of science had been 
transformed. This continued a trend from the late nineteenth century, when the 
term “scientific romance” was used in Britain to describe work by writers such 
as H.G. Wells and Jules Verne. And we can trace the evolution of science fiction 
as a literary genre through the various stages of the Industrial Revolution, linked 
to the popularisation of scientific discovery from the early eighteenth century 
onwards. Of course, it can and has been argued that science fiction emerged 
when ‘science’ itself did.  
Between the appearance of Aristotle’s To Organon in the 4th century B.C. and 
Bacon’s Novum Organum in 1620, there was no strict disunity between what, 
today, we call science and what we broadly call fiction. It was Bacon – regarded 
by Voltaire as the father of experimental philosophy – who insisted upon the 
dissolution of myths and the substitution of facts for ‘fancy.’ The sovereignty of man, 
he argued, lieth in knowledge. Yet, as Derrida has argued, if “scientific knowledge 
is a power; art is what it does not suffice to know.”29 The dichotomy of science/ 
fiction not only establishes the terms of an antagonism but, in a dialectical 
movement in which the hegemony of knowledge asserts and ramifies itself, 
inscribes a detour of truth through fiction – a movement dilated within what 
Derrida, in a critique of Lacan’s seminar on Edgar Allan Poe, calls “the time of an 
algorithm.”30 In a later seminar on Gide (1958), Lacan similarly advances the 
observation that “there is so little opposition between this Dichtung and Wahrheit 
in its nakedness that the fact of the poetic operation rather should give us pause 
before the characteristic which is forgotten in all truth, that it declares itself in the 
structure of fiction.”31 From which Derrida draws the following conclusion: 
 
Truth governs the fictional element of its manifestation, which permits it 
to be or to become what it is, to declare itself. Truth governs this element 
 
29  Derrida, “Economimesis” 5. 
30  Jacques Derrida, “Le facteur de la vérité,” The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, 
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987) 436. 
31  Jacques Lacan, “The Youth of Gide, or the Letter and Desire,” Écrits 625 – translation 





from its origin or its telos, which finally co-ordinates this concept of 
literary fiction with a highly classical interpretation of mimēsis: a detour 
toward the truth, more truth in the fictive representation than in reality, 
increased fictionality, “superior realism.”32 
 
Another End-of-History Is Possible 
 
A critical-satirical turn in modern science fiction can be traced back to such 
works as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and the earlier writings of Voltaire and 
Jonathan Swift. Frankenstein presents the dilemma of “artificial life” as the 
spectre haunting instrumentalist Reason, while both Micromégas and Gulliver’s 
Travels are reflections upon ideas previously expressed in Bacon’s Novum 
Organum – in which the concept of una scientia universalis explicitly links 
knowledge and political power. But where science fiction is generally viewed as 
continuing a long tradition of utopian and speculative literature, here the 
transparently mimetic character of this projection is subverted by way of a 
sceptical reflexivity, brought to bear as discourse. The broad ramification of this 
critical-satirical turn encompasses the entire epistemological and speculative 
orientation of the genre, extending to every aspect of its realism. At the same 
time, this turn is mirrored in a consciousness of science fiction having become, as 
J.G. Ballard argues, the only possible realism. “Everything,” Ballard writes,  
 
is becoming science fiction. From the margins of an almost invisible 
literature has sprung the intact reality of the twentieth century. […] In 
essence, science fiction is a response to science and technology as 
perceived by the inhabitants of the consumer goods society, and 
recognizes that the role of the writer today has totally changed – he is 
now merely one of a huge army of people filling the environment with 
fictions of every kind. To survive, he must become far more analytic, 
approaching his subject matter like a scientist or engineer. If he is to 
produce fiction at all, he must out-imagine everyone else, scream louder, 
whisper more quietly. For the first time in the history of narrative fiction, 
it will require more than talent to become a writer.33 
 
 
32  Derrida, “Le facteur de la vérité,” 467-68. 
33  J.G. Ballard, “Fictions of All Kinds,” #Accelerate#: The Accelerationist Reader, ed. Robin 





This only possible realism is the very subversion of every realism. “Above all,” 
Ballard suggests, “science fiction is likely to be the only form of literature which 
will cross the gap between the dying narrative fiction of the present and the 
cassette and videotape fictions of the near future.”34  
But how does this distinguish science fiction from a trivialising ‘reality’ of 
technical artefacts? Artefacts that are supposedly of their time by somehow 
nevertheless being before it? 
Intuiting this recurrent mode of anachronism in the formulation of what 
science fiction is, Nabokov once observed that if the strict definition of a literary 
genre were to be applied, it would be necessary to begin with Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest.35 Irrespective of how the term “strict” is defined, Nabokov is right 
in intuiting The Tempest’s situation at a critical juncture in the relationship 
between history, knowledge and art, and the discourse of power and realpolitik. 
There is also the fact that Shakespeare’s text represents something of a preview 
of the crisis in the ‘real’ inaugurated by the capitalist system of value-production 
in the following century, the subsequent ‘autonomy’ of the commodity fetish, the 
post-industrial “society of the spectacle” and the more-or-less current ‘cybernetic 
revolution.’ That is to say, of a quasi-automated socio-political apparatus of 
control, computed and operated by an epistemic system whose proxies threaten 
– beyond any ‘purely’ mimetic function – to become independent and 
overwhelm their master. This revolutionary threat is averted by a strategic 
manoeuvre of self-supersession, which in fact relinquishes nothing. Power lives 
on, as it were, in the figure of a sentimentalised ‘emancipative’ Reason. In this, 
Shakespeare’s text seems to intuit the coming ‘technological singularity’ – 
wherein an all-too-human tyranny engineers its succession under the guise of a 
‘posthuman future’ – is brought into view as the true meaning of this History-
annihilating tempest. 
Borrowing its title from a line in Shakespeare’s play, Aldous Huxley’s Brave 
New World (a 1932 re-versioning of perhaps the very first sci-fi ‘novel,’ Plato’s 
Republic), offered precisely such a futuristic vision of technological utopia and 
social engineering; a vision which Bertrand Russell (whose The Scientific Outlook 
appeared a year earlier), lamented “is all too likely to come true.”36 Like The 
Tempest, Brave New World treats the relationship between knowledge, illusion 
 
34  Ballard, “Fictions of All Kinds” 237. 
35  And, presumably, Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso and Cyrano de Bergerac’s Voyage de la Terre 
à la Lune, among others. See Vladimir Nabokov, Strong Opinions (New York: Vintage, 
1973) 87. 





and the power of reason. Unlike Shakespeare’s play, however, Huxley’s novel is 
a savage critique of the idea of benevolent science and bio-technological progress. 
In this “brave new world” the perfectibility of man has given way to the 
abolition of the human, where man’s existence becomes a ‘consensual’ 
enslavement to technocratic rationalism, eugenics, social Darwinism and the 




The pantographic exuberance38 of Huxley’s nightmare of universal happiness 
exposes the contradictions of utopian thought linked to the emancipation of man 
from the so-called irrationalism of nature (capitalism, by any other name). We 
are confronted with the terrible realisation that utopias are not merely political 
fictions but always threaten to become real. “Life,” as Huxley’s epigraph 
announces, “marches towards utopias,” and it is the task of humanity to 
discover the means to avoid their definitive realisation. Here, art and fiction are 
not only the guiding imagination of a science of truth, but its homeostatic 
regulator, guarding against scientific excess (including what Gide calls a realism 
of “petty and contingent facts”39), reminding us that scientific “progress” 
ultimately serves its own ends and that these ends are not always compatible 
with the idea of humanity.  
In The Tempest, Shakespeare, borrowing from Montaigne, also reflects upon 
the possibility of an ideal society governed by reason. The microcosm of 
Prospero’s island is a working hypothesis of such a pseudo-utopia, organised 
around the singular idea of a real accession to power via a certain truth of the 
principle of scripta manent. It represents a dictatorship of ‘pure reason,’ with its 
systematic vanities, its narcissism, its overweening ambition to universality. The 
illusionism vested in a scientia universalis is relinquished only at the point at 
which Prospero abandons (flees?) his island and returns, from exile in the realm 
of ‘phantasy,’ to that of ‘real’ political power. The authoritarianism of Prospero’s 
‘science’ exposes itself in its hidden counterpart, hinted at in the alien/ated 
 
37  It is in this respect that Ballard argues, however contentiously, of “The compassion, 
imagination, lucidity and vision of H.G. Wells and his successors [e.g., Huxley], and 
above all their grasp of the real identity of the twentieth century, dwarf the alienated 
and introverted fantasies of James Joyce, Eliot and the writers of the so-called Modern 
Movement, a nineteenth-century offshoot of bourgeois rejection.” Ballard, “Fictions of 
All Kinds” 237. 
38  Baudrillard n.p. 





(colonised, enslaved, subproletarian, denaturised) figure of Caliban, representing 
a completely other kind of ‘utopia’ from the one promised – but never realised – 
by Prospero’s invocation of scientia universalis. It is a utopia, as Montaigne says 
(in reply to Plato), which “hath […] no knowledge of letters, no intelligence of 
numbers, no name of magistrate, nor of politike superioritie.”40 Prospero’s 
techno-primitivist ‘science’ is here vested in the art (the stratagem) of a concealing-
unconcealment, in which the organic veils of truth appear in the operations of 
a fiction that has been ‘rationalised’ into a system indistinguishable from it. 
As framed in Shakespeare’s text, this simulacral state of nature contains no 
falsehood as such, merely an ‘ignorance’ of the Law of scientia universalis. There can 
neither be any question of access to a doctrine of ‘truth’ beyond its own narrative 
enframing. And insofar as its topos is made to resemble the archetypal garden, it 
serves to evoke a regression of savage thought forever falling under the sway of 
a technē politikē it is incapable of representing to itself, other than as a miraculous 
power. It is this illiterate, superstitious non-knowledge that nevertheless 
underwrites Prospero’s own panoptical dystopia. It is both a prison and a phantasm: 
an ecology of radical contradictions, driven by a metabolic rift in the subordinated 
forces of nature and a fantastic return of the real by way of the technē of the word. 
As allegory of a certain transcendental reason at the service of an ultimate 
restitution of the political order, this movement becomes the object of a whole series 
of ideologically inflected “sciences,” culminating in that of a historical 
materialism that (in a seeming re-enactment of Prospero drowning his books) 
supersedes itself in the accomplishment of the End of History and the insipidity, 




Seemingly worlds away, the inauguration of the “space race” by the launch of 
Sputnik by the USSR in 1957 – and brought to a climax by the Apollo lunar 
missions twelve years later – served to erode many of the conventional 
distinctions that had grown out of the Renaissance between science, fiction and 
‘science fiction.’ By 1975, after the remnants of the Apollo project had morphed 
into Skylab (accompanying a vast communications project anticipating the 
advent of GPS), the space race had exhausted its immediate value as political 
spectacle as well, supposedly, as its scientific raison d’être. Where it had been von 
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Braun’s express view that Apollo was simply a dry run for manned missions to 
other planets in the solar system, for those holding the NASA purse-strings it 
had served ultimately as a potlatch directed at Moscow (like Reagan’s “Star 
Wars” project a decade later and, arguably, the Space Shuttle programme that 
replaced Apollo, whose Soviet analogue – Buran – virtually bankrupted Roscosmos 
at the beginning of the 1990s).  
For the grand historical occasion marking the transition from interplanetary 
to Earth-bound ‘manned space exploration,’ the Soviet and US governments 
orchestrated another bit of live televised agitprop, symbolising the new policy of 
détente and ceremonially marking the official end of the superpower “space 
race,” with a handshake between the crews of Soyuz 19 and the last Apollo 
module to be launched. It occurred at a time of extraordinary political unreality 
in the US, after the turmoil of the Nixon administration and the Vietnam War, 
and against a backdrop of paranoia and conspiracy theories not far removed 
from the daily fair of TV news reality. In any case, by 1975 the vision of a future 
space-faring species (in Carl Sagan’s phraseology) appeared to have terminated 
in low Earth orbit, where it has remained more or less ever since, pending the 
future emergence of another corporate-state arms race.42 
The termination of the lunar programme and the one-off Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project thus presenting a fertile opportunity for an obscure group of British 
filmmakers to produce a fake episode of the popular Science Report documentary 
series on Anglia TV. Directed by Christopher Miles and featuring former 
newscaster (and Tory member of parliament) Tim Brinton, Alternative 3 (1977) 
presented itself as an investigative report into links between climate change, 
Britain’s “brain drain,” and a secret US-Soviet project to establish a colony on 
Mars. Intended for broadcast on April Fools Day, the Science Report hoax 
supposedly provoked front-page hysteria in the nation’s tabloid press, 
reminiscent of Orson Welles’ 1938 radio broadcast of War of the Worlds. Yet 
unlike Peter Hyams’ Capricorn One of the same year, which converted the Apollo 
lunar landing conspiracy theories into a fake NASA mission to Mars (again 
replete with live TV broadcasts), Alternative 3 exploited the medium of the TV 
 
42  One that may be driven by the entry of China, Japan, India, Israel and by privateers 
like Virgin Galactic and SpaceX. There have, in any case, been an increasing number of 
revivals of Wernher von Braun’s space colonisation project, from Robert Zubrin’s Mars 
Direct – the inspiration behind Brian De Palma’s Mission to Mars (2000) and Ridley 
Scott’s Martian (2015) – to Elon Musk’s SpaceX, which in 2018 successfully launched a 
test payload aboard the Falcon Heavy rocket comprising a Tesla Roadster, a stereo 
playing David Bowie’s “Space Oddity” on a loop, and a digital copy of Isaac Asimov’s 





science documentary to expose a (fake) conspiracy between the Cold War 
powers in which the Soyuz/Apollo programmes served as a joint front to cover-
up a (fictionally ‘real’) Mars landing. Of course, what Alternative 3 was actually 
about was the ideological ‘medium’ of information itself. 
Combined with ‘real-world’ scenarios of industrial wastage, over-population, 
resource degradation, ecological catastrophe and every other life-threatening 
symptom of globalisation, Alternative 3 uncannily projected a conspiratorial 
vision of the end of the Cold War, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, the all-
pervasiveness of the military-industrial complex and the secret commodification 
of space. And it’s in this last respect – as prospective cinema of the Anthropocene 
– that Alternative 3 is most incisive. Posed as an escape plan (while there’s still 
time to leave this planet and colonise another), what the film’s eponymous 
“Alternative 3” in fact proffers is a bold project for the preservation of the status 
quo under the guise firstly of sustainable political, economic and technological 
progress (space as the ultimate arbiter of social-Darwinistic struggle, in which 
the Cold War has become merely a pretence) and secondly of environmental 
transcendence (the colonisation space and evacuation of Earth as necessity). Both 
are nevertheless suspended in a type of “indefinite and unending”43 hyper-
industrial present, whose aim is to propagate a simulacrum of itself, both in 
space (other worlds) and time (ownership of the future). This is precisely the 
implied sense of ‘global power’ that merges with Fukuyama’s post-1989 “End of 
History” and what Baudrillard calls the “projective hypostasis of the robot.”44  
 
The Future of a Disaster 
 
In its increasingly critical response to the evolution of corporate-political power 
and the cyberneticisation of society, ‘science fiction’ at the turn of the millennium 
was no longer concerned with positing a present-transcended but – like Terry 
Gilliam’s 1995 remake of Marker’s La Jetée, 12 Monkeys – a future-foreclosed. In 
this mode of recursive cinema, History collapses back into the illusion of itself in 
a closed loop of collective alienation, manufactured consent, rampant commodi-
fication and the advent of a “post-truth” epoch dominated by fully-automated 
global surveillance systems. We have moved from the panoptical war machine of 
Godard’s Alphaville (1964) to the multi-level computer-simulation of Fassbinder’s 
Welt am Draht. Fassbinder’s “Simulacron” (designed by the “Institut für Kybernetik 
 
43  J.G. Ballard, “Memories of the Space Age,” The Penguin Book of Modern British Short Stories, 
ed. Malcolm Bradbury (London: Penguin, 1988) 237. 





und Zukunftsforschung” [Cybernetics and Future Research Institute] as a global 
simulation or virtual reality machine for modelling future economic events) is to 
Godard’s “α60” (the handiwork of a certain Professor von Braun) as William 
Gibson’s “Matrix” is to Kubrick’s “HAL.” The world of Fassbinder’s “Simulacron” 
is itself an immersive expanded cinema, in which the carceral logic of subjection re-
evolves into the production of subjectivity: there is no external galaxy of the ‘real’ 
to which its pseudo-protagonists might escape, there is only the “simulation” of 
an outside, itself a simulation. Ultimately there’s nothing but simulacra all the 
way down.  
In 2003 Gibson remarked that, if “science fiction” has tended increasingly 
towards cinematic realism, this derives from an impulse to conceal the fact that 
“we have no future because our present is too volatile… We have only risk 
management. The spinning of the given moment’s scenario.”45 According to 
Gibson, as Western society evolves further into the realm of the virtual and the 
socalled posthuman, “the future” tends increasingly to assume the appearance of 
a preservation strategy.46 This sense of “preservation,” in which science fiction 
corresponds to a multiple-scenario system of prospective disaster management 
overlapping the Anthropocene, points to the tension between the instrumental 
function of simulationism and the relation of fiction-to-truth (in Lacan’s 
formulation) as a signifying automatism in which technology, the (future-
historical) present, and the real are equally (if not equivalently) construed. Not 
only is science fiction a “mapping of the topography of a yawning 
postcapitalism,”47 as D. Harlan Wilson has observed, but is itself the discourse of 
its operations, indeed of its very possibility. And if “Gibson and Bruce Sterling 
[…] fetishized how electronic technologies invaded, modified, and evolved the 
flesh,” via “a shared preoccupation with […] commodification of the body and, 
by extension, the psyche,”48 this is precisely a measure of the autonomous function 
 
45  William Gibson, Pattern Recognition (New York: Berkeley Books, 2003) 59. 
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Freud and Marx attribute to the fetish as such, as the instigation of agency in and 
by a system of alienation it would otherwise be taken to merely represent or 
describe. 
Yet within the discourse of posthistoricism après Fukuyama it is not the 
utopian future but the imagined present that stands as the conservational 
horizon of this “brave new world”: a world nevertheless verifiable only as data-
points in an ongoing “hyperstitional” multiple-scenario construct, designed to 
perpetuate itself ad aeternitatem. These are what Gibson, in “The Gernsback 
Continuum” (1981), called semiotic ghosts – a cyberneticised collective unconscious 
that exists, like its Freudian doppelgänger, in timeless superposition. Alien, this 
“thing that thinks”49 is no mere analogue of the human, but indicates its – so to 
speak – divine inscription in the very stuff of the universe (pure information): the 
stuff from which probability flows towards an inevitable encounter with a cosmic 
intelligence. In the “epoch” of space exploration, this aspiration-cum-preservation-
strategy finds its most explicit form in those summarised digests of human life 
on Earth sent aboard deep-space probes like Pioneer (10 and 11) and Voyager 
(1 and 2), addressed to distant extraterrestrial (or future human) ‘life’ – each 
containing an eccentric array of scientific and cultural data selected by a NASA 
committee chaired by Carl Sagan: from human biology and Earth’s relative 
location in the galaxy, to recordings of Bach and images of people shopping in 
supermarkets.  
As a projected encounter with extraterrestrial life – like Nicola Tesla’s radio 
communications with Mars – Pioneer and Voyager represent the export of a cosmic 
Humanism. “Billions of years from now,” Sagan wrote, “our sun, then a distended 
red giant star, will have reduced Earth to a charred cinder. But the Voyager 
record will still be largely intact, in some other remote region of the Milky Way 
galaxy, preserving a murmur of an ancient civilisation that once flourished – 
perhaps before moving on to greater deeds and other worlds […].”50 Voyager’s 
message “to future times and beings”51 – objectively interpretable, so Sagan 
believed, by any sufficiently advanced “space-faring” species – represents a human 
abstract for whom both History and the fantastic dream of universal knowledge 
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are commodities like any other, married to the sentimental idea of living on (what 
we might call the derivatives market in the future of an illusion). It is a narrative of 
projection and (narcissistic) re-encounter that has found a more recent (and more 
local) iteration with the 2018 launch of the Arch Mission Foundation’s prototype 
archive of “critical human knowledge” aboard the SpaceX Falcon Heavy, it has 
taken the provisional form of an “off-site backup,” ultimately envisaged as a 
distributed data network in orbit around each of the planets in the solar system, 




The “Arch” (or ark) is encoded in a variety of formats, including 360 terabyte 
datacrystals, capable of resisting cosmic radiation, with an estimated 
functionality of 14 billion years (the digital episteme as transcendental signified). 
As its name intends, this Anthropocenic contingency plan represents nothing 
less than a future knowledge-platform for an expanded field of human 
habitation off-world: for the Ark is not simply an escape vehicle, but a system of 
dissemination and re-colonisation. What presents itself as a survival strategy is 
thus also the germ of a future space technocracy, whose ultimate beneficiary 
(echoing Aaron Swartz’s critique of the intellectual property regimes of JSTOR et 
al.52) would not be those escaping the Corporate-State disaster of the 
Anthropocene (and its micromanaged, algorithmic, proprietary neoliberalism) – 
perhaps in the hope of establishing a ‘future’ public domain – but rather 
archmission.org itself, their partner Cloud Constellation Corporation, and their 
institutional subscribers (the dead hand of so-called postcapitalism).  
While the science of bulk data transmission and storage in outer-space 
represents a serious logistical challenge, the idea that such projects are 
ideologically neutral represents the dominant science fiction of our era. It is 
possible, though, that one day these futurist time-capsules will, despite 
themselves, come more and more to resemble Frankenstein’s “monstrous” 
doppelgänger and Huxley’s “savage”: failed evolutionary escapees from the 
videodrome of the techno-capitalist sublime, in whose image they were created 
(Huxley’s “World State”). This hyperstitional relay, from the “imaginary” to 
totalisation in the “real,” reprises to a certain extent Baudrillard’s argument 
concerning the ideological saturation of the epistēmē, and consequently of the 
belief in an emancipatory scientism: 
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We can no longer imagine other universes; and the gift of transcendence 
has been taken from us as well. Classic SF was one of expanding 
universes: it found its calling in narratives of space exploration, coupled 
with more terrestrial forms of exploration and colonization indigenous to 
the 19th and 20th centuries. There is no cause-effect relationship to be 
seen here. Not simply because, today, terrestrial space has been virtually 
completely encoded, mapped, inventoried, saturated; has in some sense 
been shrunk by globalization; has become a collective marketplace not 
only for products but also for values, signs, and models, thereby leaving 
no room any more for the imaginary. It is not exactly because of all this 
that the exploratory universe (technical, mental, cosmic) of SF has also 
stopped functioning. But the two phenomena are closely linked, and they 
are two aspects of the same general evolutionary process: a period of 
implosion, after centuries of explosion and expansion. When a system 
reaches its limits, its own saturation point, a reversal begins to takes 
place. And something happens also to the imagination.53 
 
But whether apocalyptic futurism or self-preservational status quo, the science 
fiction of the current global political disorder – like the geo-technic epoch in 
which it is reified (this socalled Anthropocene) – marks the subsumption of the 
imaginary into the ideological at precisely that point at which ideology itself appears 
to dissipate under the critical mass of the ‘real’ (climate change, the geological 
register, etc.). This is the moment Stiegler refers to as the “digital epistēmē,”54 
the point of generalisation of the cybernetic conception of information throughout 
and in fact as the so-called medium of the real and thus, in McLuhan’s terms, its 
“message.”  
Such a general dissemination of the apparently fictive doesn’t accomplish 
itself as an algorithmic universalism, but the contrary, as emergent specificity, as 
idiom, as – in a sense – particles of thought extrapolated from a probability field: 
the infinity of detail that constitutes what Ballard called “the eternal present of 
this timeless zone.”55 It is this particularity, this point de capiton56 of ideology in 
the real that orientates the entire epistemological schema as ideological par 
 
53  Baudrillard n.p. 
54  Bernard Stiegler, “Hermeneutics, Heuristics and Paideia in the Digital Episteme,” talk 
delivered at the University of California at Berkeley, October 2013. 
55  Ballard, “Memories of the Space Age” 237-38. 
56  See Jacques Lacan, “Le point de capiton,” Le séminaire III: Les Psychoses, 1955-56, ed. 





excellence, and which extends its claims of monopoly over every mode of 
computable future, including all of the computable non-futures (ideology is not 
what Baudrillard calls the “coefficient of reality […] proportional to the 
imaginary,”57 but the field within which any such coefficient may be inscribed). 
In doing so it automatically defines a singular ‘horizon’ of all possible futures – 
and of the impossibility of any (other) future of possibility itself beyond this 
singularity – a movement that comes into view, at the horizon of the End of 
History, as infinitely self-repeating in an accumulation of toxic world-suffocating 
‘simulacra’ of a universal present. This (dys)utopia is all-inclusive: even its 
dysfunctions feed the play of (im)possibilities. And it’s here that science fiction, 
previously Id to rationalism’s Ego, reveals itself as comprising not a deviation 
from the real but realism’s foundation.58 It inscribes that projective, cinematic 
realm of the to come in which the possibility of the impossible resides, and 
through which ‘we’ obtain ‘our’ perspective on a future that – like the Cartesian 
planet-annihilating warhead in Carpenter and O’Bannon’s Dark Star (1974) – we 
may fulfil only by adverting to our own unreality. 
 
 
57  Baudrillard n.p. 
58  Science may contradict ideology (as systems of meaning) in certain respects, but it cannot 
critique it. 
